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ABORIGINAL TITLE OR THE PARAMOUNTCY
DOCTRINE? JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH FLOUNDERS IN
FEDERAL WATERS OFF ALASKA IN NATIVE VILLAGE
OF EYAK V. TRA WLER DIANE MARIE, INC.
Andrew P. Richards
Abstract: In Johnson v. McIntosh and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court
established the principle that aboriginal title allows Indian tribes to exclusively use and
occupy their territories after they come under United States sovereignty. In Native Village of
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., five Alaska Native villages asserted aboriginal title to
areas of the seabed and ocean off Alaska. The villages argued that federal fisheries
regulations violate their aboriginal title by allowing non-Natives to fish within those areas,
while excluding most of the villagers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected the villages' claim, holding that the paramountcy doctrine had extinguished
the villages' aboriginal title. Under the paramountcy doctrine, the federal government must
control exploitation of the seabed and ocean to fulfill its duty to defend the nation and to
regulate international commerce. The Eyak court held that aboriginal title would conflict with
federal supremacy over the seabed and ocean off Alaska. This Comment argues that the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit en banc or the U.S. Supreme Court should hold that
the paramountcy doctrine did not extinguish aboriginal title to the seabed and waters off
Alaska because aboriginal title does not interfere with the federal government's ability to
protect the nation or to regulate international trade.
For seven thousand years, people from five Alaska Native villages
(the villages) fished and hunted along the southern coast of what is today
the State of Alaska.' They continued to use their traditional areas until
1995, when the Secretary of the Department of Commerce limited
fishing for halibut and sablefish off Alaska.2 Previously, both Alaska
Natives and non-Natives pursued halibut and sablefish from Southeast
Alaska to the Bering Sea. The ease of entry into these two fisheries
spawned a modem-day maritime gold rush in which too many people
risked too much money and life for steadily diminishing profits.3 Fearing
that over-fishing would destroy the halibut and sablefish stocks, the
Secretary curtailed fishing seasons by the late 1980s from months down
I. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999) [hereinafter Eyak I]. The five villages were the Alaska Native
Villages of Eyak, Tatitlek, Chanega, Port Graham, and Nanwalek. Id.
2. Pacific Halibut Fisheries, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375, 59,402 (Nov. 9, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
679).
3. Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable Quotas and the Magnuson Act: Creating
Economic Efficiency in Our Nation's Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 267, 283 (1996).
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to days.4 In 1995, the Secretary responded to concerns about harvesters'
dwindling profit margins, and the inherent dangers of fisheries built on
wild two- and three-day openings, by limiting the number of people
allowed to participate in the halibut and sablefish fisheries to those who
qualified for Individual Fishing Quota shares (IFQs).5
IFQs enable their holder to catch a certain number of pounds of
halibut and sablefish each season.6 The catch is virtually guaranteed7 and
fishing is allowed over a nearly nine-month season. 8 The Secretary
issued IFQs to the owners or lessees of vessels used to catch halibut or
sablefish between 1988 and 1990.9 Thus, the government rewarded those
who invested capital in the halibut and sablefish fisheries, but not
necessarily those who did the fishing. The number of IFQs awarded to
any individual depended on the amount of halibut or sablefish caught by
that person's vessel during the 1980s. 10 For IFQ holders, the new system
is a vast improvement upon the earlier, open-access model in which
harvesters were out of luck if they found no fish during the brief
openers. Today, anyone who wants to benefit from the IFQ system but
who did not initially qualify for IFQs-hired skippers, deckhands, and
those who did not fish between 1988 and 1990-must buy the right to
fish, the IFQs, from someone who already owns IFQs.'1
In 1998 and 2002, the villages claimed that the IFQ regulations
violated their fishing rights based on aboriginal title to areas of the Gulf
of Alaska.' 2 Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in
4. Id.
5. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska; Individual Fishing Quota Management
Measures, 50 C.F.R. § 679.40 (2002).
7. The amount of fish caught is not absolutely guaranteed because IFQ holders must still manage
to catch the fish. However, it is very likely that IFQ holders will catch their quota because they now
have less competition and longer seasons.
8. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone offAlaska; Sablefish Managed Under the Individual
Fishing Quota Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 7719, 7719 (Feb. 18, 2003).
9. 50 C.F.R. § 679.40(a)(2)(A)-(B).
10. An individual's vessel must have caught halibut or sablefish between 1988 and 1990 to
qualify for any IFQs. Once an individual demonstrated that his or her vessel caught halibut or
sablefish during that period, the amount of halibut harvested between 1984 and 1990, and the
amount of sablefish harvested between 1985 and 1990, determined the number of halibut and
sablefish IFQs awarded to that individual. Pacific Halibut Fisheries, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375, 59,386
(Nov. 9, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 679).
11. Buying into the IFQ system is expensive. In June 2003, halibut IFQs cost between $3.00 and
$13.00 per pound, while sablefish IFQs cost between $1.75 and $13.00 per pound. PAC. FISHING,
July 2003, at 37.
12. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998); Native Vill. of Eyak v. Evans, No. A98-0365-
CV, slip op. at 8 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Eyak II].
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Johnson v. McIntosh 13 nearly two hundred years ago, the Court has
recognized that Indian tribes hold aboriginal title to their territories. 14
Under aboriginal title, tribes may exclusively use and occupy their
territories until Congress extinguishes their title. 15 The villages argued
that the IFQ regulations limited their ability to fish in their traditional
areas of Cook Inlet and Prince William Sound, citing as evidence the
fact that the Secretary had awarded halibut IFQs to only seventeen
village members, and sablefish IFQs to only one member. 6 In Native
Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc. (Eyak 1), and Native
Village of Eyak v. Evans (Eyak JJ),18 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and the United States District Court for the District
of Alaska, respectively, held that the paramountcy doctrine had
extinguished the villages' rights. 19 Under the paramountcy doctrine, the
federal government must control the exploitation of the seabed and
ocean off the coast of the United States to fulfill its duty to defend the
nation and to regulate international commerce. 20 The Eyak I and II courts
reasoned that the villages' claimed aboriginal rights to the seabed and
offshore waters were incompatible with federal sovereignty over those
areas.21
This Comment argues that aboriginal title is compatible with federal
sovereignty over the seabed and ocean off Alaska. Part I details the U.S.
Supreme Court's aboriginal title jurisprudence. Part II describes the
extension of federal jurisdiction over the seabed and ocean. Part III
traces the history of aboriginal title claims to the seabed and ocean off
Alaska. In Part IV, this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit en banc
or the U.S. Supreme Court should apply the Court's traditional
aboriginal title analysis, and not the paramountcy doctrine, to aboriginal
13. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
14. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345-47 (1941); Cramer v. United
States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (19 23); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,
667-69 (1974) [hereinafter Oneida 1].
15. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347.
16. STEVE J. LANGDON, RESOURCE USES BY ALASKA NATIVES AND NON-NATIVES IN THE
CENTRAL GULF OF ALASKA OUTSIDE THREE MILES IN THE 20TH CENTURY 126-27 (Sept. 15, 2000)
(unpublished report pertaining to Eyak II) (on file with author) (noting also that other, unidentified
village members may hold IFQs).
17. 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
18. No. A98-0365-CV (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
19. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d at 1096-97; Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 28.
20. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
21. Eyakl, 154 F.3d at 1096-97; Eyak H, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 31.
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title claims to the seabed and ocean off Alaska because those claims are
consistent with federal sovereignty over offshore areas.
1. ABORIGINAL TITLE ALLOWS A TRIBE TO EXCLUSIVELY
USE AND OCCUPY ITS TERRITORY
Nearly two hundred years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated
the concept of aboriginal title into American law in Johnson v.
McIntosh. The Court described the division of the New World, and
explained that discovering nations respected among themselves each
nation's right to take exclusive title to any new territory that it
discovered.23 This title gave the discovering sovereign the exclusive
right to acquire the discovered territory from resident tribes.24 Those
tribes had the right, under aboriginal title, to exclusively occupy their
territory until the sovereign acquired it, or until the sovereign exercised
its exclusive power to extinguish the tribes' title. In the United States,
only Congress has the power to extinguish aboriginal title.
2 6
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Incorporated the Concept ofAboriginal
Title into American Law Nearly Two Centuries Ago
In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced into American law
the doctrine of discovery, the principle that guided the European division
of, and protected aboriginal title to, the New World.27 The dispute in
Johnson arose from Thomas Johnson's purchase of land from the Illinois
tribe in 1775 in the area that became known as the Old Northwest.28
Johnson purchased the tribe's land in defiance of King George III's ban
on settlements after Britain won the French and Indian War in 1763.29
As successor to Britain's interest in the Old Northwest, the United States
acquired from the Illinois the same land that they had already sold to
22. 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 573.
25. Id. at 574.
26. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
27. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
28. Id. at 555-56. The term "Old Northwest" described the land south of the Great Lakes, east of
the Mississippi River, north of the Ohio River, and west of the Appalachians and other eastern
mountain ranges. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT 233 (1990).
29. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 594.
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Johnson, and in 1818 granted that land to William McIntosh.3° Johnson
took exception to the re-conveyance of what he thought was his land and
sued McIntosh in Johnson v. McIntosh, seeking to quiet title.31 The
Johnson case provided the Court with an opportunity to define tribes'
rights to territory under federal sovereignty. The success of Johnson's
suit depended on whether the Court would recognize the validity of the
title he had purchased from the Illinois.32
In Johnson, the Court explained that European nations divided the
New World among themselves under the doctrine of discovery.33 This
doctrine gave to each nation "exclusive title" to the land it discovered.34
Under this title, the discovering nation had the exclusive right to acquire
newfound territory from its Indian occupants. 35 Exclusive title also
permitted the discovering nation to convey tribal territory at will, 36 but
all conveyances came subject to the "Indian right of occupancy," now
commonly known as aboriginal title.37 Aboriginal title allowed a tribe to
exclusively use and occupy its territory after discovery.38 However, that
right was qualified by the restriction that the tribe could convey its
territory only to the nation holding exclusive title to the tribe's land.39
The Court decided that Johnson could not enforce his title in the United
States' courts40 because he purchased his land in 1775 from the Illinois
without the consent of Britain, at the time the sovereign reigning over
the Illinois' land.4'
Less than a decade after Johnson, the Court emphasized the
subordination of tribal sovereignty over Indian land within the United
States. 42 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,43 the Cherokee sued the State of
30. Id. at 560.
31. Id. at 571-72.
32. Id. at 572.
33. Id. at 574.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 573.
36. Id. at 574.
37. DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 36 (2d ed.
2002).
38. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 604-05.
41. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 487 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
42. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
43. 30 U.S. I (1831).
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Georgia to prevent it from seizing and dividing their land.44 The Court,
however, refused to entertain the Cherokee's suit under the Court's
original jurisdiction.45 The Court decided that although the Constitution
gave it original jurisdiction over cases between states and foreign
nations, the Cherokee were not a foreign nation but a "domestic
dependent nation[]. ' 46 The Court reasoned that the Cherokee were
"completely under [United States] sovereignty and dominion" because
the United States would consider itself invaded if any foreign nation
attempted to acquire land from, or form political connections with, the
Cherokee.47 The Court described the relationship between the Cherokee
Nation and the United States as resembling "that of a ward to his
guardian., 48 After Johnson and Cherokee Nation, tribes retained their
right to exclusively use and occupy their territory, but exercised that
right subject to federal sovereignty.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Following Johnson Have Refined
the Concept ofAboriginal Title
U.S. Supreme Court decisions after Johnson have defined the scope
of aboriginal title and the conditions under which aboriginal title can be
extinguished.49 In those cases, the Court held that all territories acquired
by the United States are subject to aboriginal title50 and that aboriginal
title allows tribes to exploit the natural resources of their land5 and
water territories. 52 The Court's precedent permits only Congress to
extinguish aboriginal title, 53  but does not require Congress to
compensate tribes when it extinguishes their title because
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 17-18.
48. Id. at 17.
49. COHEN, supra note 41, at 489-91. In decisions following Johnson, the Court also addressed
the enforceability of aboriginal title. See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S.
339, 347 (1941); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923). Though it is not clear from
these decisions, aboriginal title appears to be enforceable against all but Congress, which has the
exclusive ability to extinguish aboriginal title. See generally COHEN, supra note 41, at 488-89. In
any case, the Eyak I and H courts did not question the enforceability of the villages' title.
50. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 346.
51. COHEN, supra note 41, at 491 (citing Santa Fe, 314 U.S. 339; United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 11, 117 (1938)).
52. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 670
n.15, 687 (1979).
53. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347.
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congressionally unrecognized aboriginal title is not a "property right"
protected by the Fifth Amendment.
54
1. Scope ofAboriginal Title
Federal law protects aboriginal title to all territory acquired by the
United States.5 5 In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.,56 a
railroad company claimed unencumbered title to part of the land
conveyed to the United States from Mexico known as the Mexican
Cession. 7 Congress granted the land to the railroad company's
predecessor in 1866.58 In 1883, President Chester Arthur established the
Walapais Indian Reservation, which surrounded some of the railroad's
land.5 9 Before the Ninth Circuit, the United States argued that the
railroad's land within the Reservation came subject to the Walapais'
aboriginal title.60 The court held otherwise, deciding that aboriginal title
did not exist in the Mexican Cession.6' On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that all territories acquired by the United States
are subject to aboriginal title.62 The Court remanded the case to allow the
Walapais the opportunity to prove that their title existed in fact.
63
Within territory subject to aboriginal title, tribes possess both the
rights retained and given up by treaty. As the U.S. Supreme Court
explained in United States v. Winans,64 treaties are "not a grant of rights
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those
not granted., 65 Among the rights arising from aboriginal title is a tribe's
right to exploit the resources on and beneath the surface of its territory.66
54. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 284-85 (1955).
55. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 346.
56. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
57. Id. at 343-45. The territory known as the Mexican Cession included land in what are today
the states of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming. COHEN, supra note 41,
at 518. Mexico ceded this territory to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2,
1848, U.S.-Mex., art. V, 9 Stat. 922, 926.
58. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 343.
59. Id. at 357.
60. Id. at 343-44.
61. Id. at 345-46.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 360.
64. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
65. Id. at 381.
66. COHEN, supra note 41, at 491 (citing Santa Fe, 314 U.S. 339; United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938)).
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In United States v. Shoshone Tribe,67 the question before the Court was
whether the Shoshone tribe's aboriginal title included the right to use the
timber and minerals of its territory.68 The Court concluded that those
resources belonged to the tribe by dint of aboriginal title established by
"undisturbed possess[ion] of the soil from time immemorial. 69
While many aboriginal title cases involve disputes over land, the
rights conferred by aboriginal title are not restricted to terra firma. In
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n (Fishing Vessel), 70 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized non-
exclusive Indian fishing rights in the Pacific Ocean off Washington
State.7 ' The Court held that tribal parties to the Stevens Treaties reserved
the right to harvest up to fifty percent of the fish passing through their
fishing grounds, including those in the Pacific Ocean.72 Five years later,
in United States v. Washington,73 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the right of
the Makah tribe, a signatory to one of the Stevens Treaties, to fish up to
forty miles off the coast of Washington State.74 Although both Fishing
Vessel and Washington involved treaty rights, the Court has recognized
that those rights are based upon aboriginal title established by prior
exclusive use of the waters at issue.75
The U.S. Supreme Court has never considered whether aboriginal title
exists in the seabed and ocean off Alaska. However, in response to
conflicts between Alaska Natives and non-Indians over control of fish
trap sites,76 the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior issued an
opinion in 1942 finding that Alaska Natives had established exclusive
rights to the seabed and ocean off Alaska, based on their use of those
areas. 77 Following this opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that
Congress also believed that these aboriginal rights existed.78 In
67. 304 U.S. I 11 (1938).
68. Id. at 113.
69. Id. at 117.
70. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
71. Id. at 670 n.15, 689.
72. Id. In 1854 and 1855, many Northwest tribes signed treaties with the United States. Id. at
661-62 n.2. These treaties are known as the Stevens Treaties because they were all negotiated by
Isaac Stevens, the first Governor of the Washington Territory. Id. at 666.
73. 730 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 1318.
75. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905); see also
Washington, 730 F.2d at 1315-16.
76. Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 461 (1942).
77. Id. at 476-77.
78. Organized Viii. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 65-67 (1962).
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Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,79 the Court held that the Alaska
Statehood Act (Statehood Act) 80 neither extinguished nor formally
recognized aboriginal rights to the seabed and waters off Alaska, but
instead preserved for later resolution Alaska Native claims based on
aboriginal title.
81
2. Extinguishment ofAboriginal Title
Only Congress has the power to extinguish aboriginal title,82 and
when it exercises this power it must act in a "plain and unambiguous"
manner. 83 In Santa Fe, the railroad company insisted that President
Arthur's establishment of the Walapais Reservation in 1883 had
extinguished the Walapais' aboriginal title.84 The Court agreed that the
Walapais had abandoned their claims to land outside the Reservation
when they accepted the Reservation," but remanded the case for a
determination of whether the Walapais had occupied any of the land
inside the reservation from "time immemorial. 86 The Court reasoned
that the Walapais would hold title to that land because Congress had not
extinguished their title by treaty, warfare, purchase, or "by the exercise
of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy.' 87 Thus, the
Court in Santa Fe recognized the exclusive power of Congress to
terminate a tribe's right to use its territory.88
Even when a tribe's aboriginal title has not been extinguished,
Congress may take resources from the tribe's territory without paying
compensation if it has not formally recognized the tribe's title.89 In Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,90 the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe of southeast
79. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
80. Alaska Statehood Act (Statehood Act) of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339.
81. Kake, 369 U.S. at 65-67 (citing the Statehood Act). In Kake, the Court also held that the State
of Alaska could regulate off-reservation fishing by Alaska Natives. Id. at 76. This Comment does
not address the implications of that holding because the Eyak villages claim rights to waters beyond
the limits of Alaska's jurisdiction.
82. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id. at 343-44.
85. Id. at 357-58.
86. Id. at 360.
87. Id. at 347.
88. Id.
89. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 284-85 (1955); COHEN, supra note
41, at 491.
90. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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Alaska argued that Congress owed them the value of timber that it had
sold from land the tribe claimed was subject to its aboriginal title.91 The
Court assumed that the Tee-Hit-Ton held aboriginal title to their land,
but concluded that their title, while permitting them to use and occupy
their land, did not give them "legal rights" to their land.92 The Court
decided that the Tee-Hit-Ton had no legal rights to their land because
Congress had not formally set aside land for them to use, as it had for the
Shoshone and other tribes with dedicated reservations. 93 Because the
Tee-Hit-Ton lacked legal rights to their land, the Court held that the
Fifth Amendment did not require that Congress compensate the Tee-Hit-
Ton for the timber taken from their territory.94
C. U.S. Supreme Court Analysis ofAboriginal Title Claims
The following three-step approach to assessing aboriginal title claims
can be distilled from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe.95
First, the Court determined whether the United States had extended its
sovereignty over the land at issue because all territory acquired by the
United States comes subject to aboriginal title.96 After recognizing that
91. Id. at 275-77.
92. Id. at 279.
93. See id. at 279, 289-90. This distinction explains why the Court ordered Congress to pay
compensation to the Shoshone tribe for taking their reservation land and its resources. United States
v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938).
94. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 288-89. Tee-Hit-Ton extended the Court's decision in Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 316 U.S. 317, 331 (1942) (holding that federal government owes no compensation
for taking Indian lands set aside by executive order).
95. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). Santa Fe represents the U.S.
Supreme Court's most complete analysis of an aboriginal title claim. The cases described in supra
notes 27-75 and accompanying text involve one or two of the three steps of Santa Fe's aboriginal
title analysis, but not all three. In Johnson and Cherokee Nation, the Court focused on the first step
of the analysis, the relationship between aboriginal title and United States sovereignty. Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572-74 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I, 16-18 (1831). The
second step of the analysis, extinguishment of aboriginal title, was also at issue in Johnson, which
emphasized that the power to extinguish aboriginal title lies exclusively with the government
extending its sovereignty over Indian territory, and in Tee-Hit-Ton, which explained that Congress
owes tribes no compensation when it extinguishes aboriginal title. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573; Tee-Hit-
Ton, 348 U.S. at 288-90. The third step of the Santa Fe analysis, proving the existence of aboriginal
title, hinges on the ability of a tribe to demonstrate that it exercised the rights stemming from
aboriginal title since time immemorial. The Court addressed the scope of those rights in Winans,
Shoshone Tribe, and Fishing Vessel. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. I 11, 116-18 (1938); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 666 nn.6-8, 679-81 (1979).
96. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 346; accord Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (9th
Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Gambell III]; see also Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 244 (1872); Johnson, 21
U.S. at 591.
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the Mexican Cession was subject to both United States sovereignty and
aboriginal title, the Court examined whether Congress had extinguished
aboriginal title in that territory.97 After concluding that Congress had not
extinguished aboriginal title, the Court remanded the case to the lower
courts to decide the third question, whether the Walapais had in fact
exclusively used and occupied their territory.98 Under Santa Fe, a court
must recognize a tribe's aboriginal title if the court finds that the United
States has extended its sovereignty over tribal territory, that Congress
has not extinguished aboriginal title to that territory, and that the tribe
has exclusively used and occupied its territory. 99
When aboriginal title does exist, it allows a tribe to exercise both the
rights reserved and relinquished by treaty.100 Among these rights is the
ability to develop the natural resources above and below the surface of
tribal territories,10 including those encompassing areas of the Pacific
Ocean. 10 2 Tribes may continue to exclusively use and occupy their
territory until Congress exercises its power to extinguish their aboriginal
title.10 3 When Congress exercises this power, it need not compensate
tribes because congressionally unrecognized aboriginal title is not a
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment. 1
04
II. THE PARAMOUNTCY DOCTRINE AND ACTS OF
CONGRESS HAVE EXTENDED FEDERAL CONTROL OVER
THE SEABED AND OCEAN
The "paramountcy doctrine" stems from two U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, United States v. California'0 5 and United States v. Texas. 10 6 In
these cases, the federal government claimed ownership of and control
over the seabed off the coasts of California and Texas, respectively.1
0 7
The Court employed sweeping language to hold in each case that the
97. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347; Johnson, 21 U.S. at 584-85.
98. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 359.
99. Id. at 345-47.
100. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
101. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938).
102. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 670
n.15, 687 (1979); United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 346-47.
104. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 284-85 (1955).
105. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
106. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
107. Texas, 339 U.S. at 709; California, 332 U.S. at 22.
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federal government must have the "paramount power" 10 8 to regulate
exploitation of the seabed and ocean to fulfill its duty to defend the
nation and to regulate international commerce.10 9 Following the Court's
recognition of this power, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA)" 0 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)."' These
acts surrendered to the states title to the seabed within three miles of
their shores"12 and extended federal "jurisdiction [and] control" over the
seabed beyond three miles from shore.' Later, Congress established its
exclusive regulatory authority over fisheries between three and 200
miles offshore' '4 through the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976 (Magnuson Act)." 5 The SLA, OCSLA, and the Magnuson Act
reflect the federal government's paramount control over the seabed and
the ocean adjacent to the United States.
A. The Paramountcy Doctrine Established Federal Control of the
Seabed and Ocean
Oil was discovered off the coast of California in 1894, and by 1926
both California and Texas were executing offshore oil leases" 6 on the
assumption that earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions had recognized
that they held title to the seabed out to three miles from shore." 7 Shortly
after California and Texas began leasing the seabed, Congress
considered bringing the seabed within the "public domain," and the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior suggested that the federal
108. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
109. Id.; California, 332 U.S. at 35-36.
110. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (2000)).
111. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000)).
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (a)(1)-(2).
113. Id. §§ 1331(a), 1332(1).
114. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(l) (2000).
115. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331,
renamed Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management (Magnuson) Act, Pub. L. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)).
116. EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER
OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 28 (2001).
117. Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV.
398, 401-03 (1948) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893); Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
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government might also lease the seabed." 8 In May 1945, the United
States took the seabed controversy to the courts by suing the Pacific
Western Oil Company to enjoin it from exercising a lease granted to it
by California.119 In September 1945, President Harry Truman declared
United States jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed 2 ° and
one month later the United States dropped its suit against Pacific
Western and instead sued California.' 2' In that suit, the United States
challenged California's ability to issue oil leases based on its alleged
ownership of the seabed off its shores. 1
22
In United States v. California, the United States argued that its
constitutional responsibility to "protect this country against dangers to
the security and tranquility of its people" required it to control use of the
"marginal sea and land under it.' ' 123 California argued that it owned the
resources of the adjacent seabed because it entered the Union on "equal
footing" with the original states, which allegedly held title to submerged
land off their coasts.' 24 The Court disagreed with California, finding no
historical support for the idea that the original thirteen colonies owned
their adjacent seabed. 25 Instead, the Court decided that the dispute was
less about title to the seabed and more about which government, state or
federal, should have the power to decide whether foreign or domestic
118. Hardwicke, supra note 117, at 401.
119. FITZGERALD, supra note 116, at 29.
120. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945). President Truman's
proclamation extended U.S. jurisdiction over the seabed to the exclusion of jurisdiction claimed by
foreign states. However, the proclamation was not intended to resolve the conflict between the
states and the federal government over ownership of the seabed within or beyond three miles from
shore. FITZGERALD, supra note 116, at 28.
121. FITZGERALD, supra note 116, at 28-29.
122. Id.
123. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29 (1947).
124. Id. at 29-30. Before the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in California and Texas, states
claimed that the "'equal footing" doctrine gave them title to the seabed off their coasts. Created by
the Court, the equal footing doctrine holds that all states, upon admission to the Union, took title to
the land beneath navigable waters within their boundaries. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,
716 (1950). The English Crown asserted sovereignty over the submerged land surrounding Britain,
and, according to the coastal states, conveyed similar rights to the colonies. FITZGERALD, supra note
116, at 29-30. The coastal states theorized that they should take title to the seabed off their shores
because they were on "equal footing" with the original thirteen states, which had inherited the
colonies' rights to the seabed by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and retained those rights when they
formed a Union. Id. Prior to the 1940s, courts supported state ownership of the seabed. John Hanna,
The Submerged Land Cases, 3 STAN. L. REV. 193,200-07 (1951).
125. California, 332 U.S. at 31-32.
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entities may extract natural resources from the "marginal sea" bordering
California.
126
The Court explained that historically the federal government claimed
dominion over the three-mile wide marginal sea to protect the nation's
neutrality,127 and recognized that the federal government's control of the
seabed and waters bordering the United States enabled it to regulate
commerce over, and fight wars on, the ocean. 128 Further, the Court
concluded that the United States' control over the "the ocean or the
ocean's bottom" was as important to federal sovereignty as ownership of
land beneath inland waters was to state sovereignty. 129 Accordingly, the
Court held that the federal government had "full dominion over" oil and
other resources of the seabed and ocean off California's coast. 
30
Three years later, the Court reaffirmed this holding in United States v.
Texas. 131 Texas, like California, advanced an "equal footing" argument
to support its claim to the land and minerals underlying the Gulf of
Mexico.' 32 Texas asserted that it owned these resources because the
Republic of Texas had previously owned them. 133 Texas maintained that
the Republic had owned and regulated the seabed, 34 and had
relinquished only its regulatory powers when it joined the Union. 135 The
Court read Texas' history differently, deciding that the Republic had
surrendered all of its claims to the seabed when it joined the Union on
equal footing with the original states. 136 Invoking the language of federal
sovereignty, the Court held that "national interests and national
responsibilities" dictate that all property interests within the "marginal
sea" must "unite in the national sovereign."'' 37 Although both California
and Texas appeared to involve only competing claims to the seabed, the
Court accepted the opportunity provided by each case to hold that the
United States' sovereignty extends over both the seabed and the ocean
126. Id. at 29.
127. Id. at 32-33.
128. Id. at 34-35.
129. Id. at 34-36.
130. Id. at 38-39.
131. 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
132. Id. at 712; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. Texas, 339 U.S. at 711.
134. Id. at 712.
135. Id. at 713.
136. Id. at 718.
137. Id. at 719.
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above the seabed. 138 Furthermore, while neither case explicitly held that
the United States owns offshore natural resources, 139 the paramountcy
decisions clearly awarded the United States control over those
resources. 1
40
B. Federal Regulation of the Seabed and Ocean from 1953 to the
Present
Between 1953 and 1976, Congress extended federal jurisdiction over
the seabed and fisheries off the coast of the United States. 41 Congress
exercised its newly won paramountcy powers over the seabed when it
passed the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act in 1953.42 The SLA conveyed to the coastal states title to the seabed
within three miles of their shores, 143 and OCSLA extended federal
jurisdiction 144 over the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which is the
seabed beyond three miles from coastal states' shorelines. 145 Both the
SLA and OCSLA preserved existing rights to the seabed under "the law
in effect at the time they may have been acquired.' 46 Two decades later,
the Magnuson Act of 1976147 extended Congress' regulatory jurisdiction
138. See id. at 718-19; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34-36 (1947).
139. Justice Frankfurter observed that while the Court held that California did not own the
seabed, the basis for the Court's finding that California had trespassed against the United States was
the United States' "dominion" over, and not its ownership of, the seabed. California, 332 U.S. at 43
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
140. In two other cases, United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v.
Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), the Court reaffirmed its California and Texas decisions. In Louisiana,
the Court held that Louisiana's claims to the seabed twenty-four miles beyond the three-mile belt
were contrary to the national interest. 339 U.S. at 701, 705. In Maine, the Court recognized U.S.
jurisdiction to the outer edge of the continental shelf, but qualified the "constitutional premise" of
its earlier decisions by noting that overruling California and Texas would disrupt years of
legislation and commercial activity founded upon those decisions. 420 U.S. at 517, 524, 528.
141. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000)); Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
265, 90 Stat. 331, renamed Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management (Magnuson)
Act, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)).
142. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (2000)); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000)).
143. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1)H2).
144. Id. § 1333(a)(1).
145. Id. §§ 1331(a), 1332(2).
146. Id. § 1342; see also id. § 1315 (identical savings clause).
147. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331,
renamed Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management (Magnuson) Act, Pub. L. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000)).
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over fisheries between 3 and 200 miles offshore.148 The enormous swath
of ocean covered by the Magnuson Act is now known as the United
States' "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ). 149 Although Congress hoped
its regulations would resuscitate depleted fish stocks, and therefore boost
harvesters' income, it passed the Magnuson Act primarily in response to
foreign domination of United States fisheries. 50 Together, the SLA,
OCSLA, and the Magnuson Act gave the coastal states title to the seabed
within three miles of their shores, extended federal control over the
OCS, and regulated fisheries between 3 and 200 miles offshore.'
5
'
Nearly twenty years after Congress passed the Magnuson Act, the
Secretary of the Department of Commerce limited access to the
commercial halibut and sablefish fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska by
instituting the IFQ program. 152 The IFQ program regulates a vast area
that includes sections of the Gulf of Alaska traditionally used by the
Eyak villages. 153 Currently, only IFQ holders can commercially fish
within those areas.' 54 In 1995, the government awarded IFQs to the
owners or lessees of vessels that legally caught and sold halibut or
sablefish between 1988 and 1990. 55 People who want to fish for halibut
148. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(l).
149. Id. § 1802(1I). Prior to 1976, all nations enjoyed the freedom to fish in waters beyond three
miles from a country's shores. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, 82-84. In 1976, the Magnuson Act created a "fishery conservation zone" (FCZ)
that included waters between 3 and 200 miles from the shores of the United States. § 101, 90 Stat. at
336. In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognized coastal states' rights
to extend their jurisdiction over the living and non-living natural resources of the seabed and its
subsoil, and the waters above the seabed, between 3 and 200 miles from their shores. United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 56, para. 1(a), 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1280.
Although the United States is not a party to the 1982 Convention, President Reagan established the
United States' EEZ by proclamation in 1983, declaring the same rights as those held by states that
are party to the 1982 Convention. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
Congress amended the Magnuson Act to regulate fisheries within the EEZ because the EEZ
includes the same waters as the FCZ. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. 99-659, §§ 101(a),
102(c)(l)(A), 100 Stat. 3706, 3707.
150. Davis, supra note 3, at 283-84.
151. The Magnuson Act did not affect rights of navigation within 200 miles of shore. See 16
U.S.C. § 1801(c)(l)-(2).
152. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1996). The Magnuson Act and
the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-176, 96 Stat. 78 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 773-773(k) (2000)), give the Secretary the authority to limit access to these fisheries.
Alliance, 84 F.3d at 345. The fact that harvesters must first catch a fish before they can claim title to
it gives them an incentive to catch as many fish as possible at one time, which is why unlimited
access to fisheries can destroy stocks. Id. at 344.
153. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998).
154. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska; Individual Fishing Quota
Management Measures, 50 C.F.R. § 679.40 (2002).
155. Id. § 679.40(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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or sablefish today, but who did not receive IFQs in 1995, must purchase
IFQs from someone who currently holds them.156 IFQs entitle harvesters
to a share of the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for a given
area. 57 Each year, the International Pacific Halibut Commission sets the
TAC for halibut, and the federal government sets the TAC for
sablefish. 158 Halibut regulations limit Alaska Native villagers to a
subsistence harvest of twenty fish per person per day. 159 Sablefish
regulations allocate all sablefish to IFQ holders, leaving none for tribal
harvest, because they assume that sablefish's preference for deep water
puts them out of the reach of all but commercial gear. '
60
The IFQ program is a striking example of the extent to which the
federal government has extended its control over offshore resources. The
U.S. Supreme Court established the foundation of this control in its
California and Texas paramountcy decisions. In those cases, the Court
held that the federal government must control the exploitation of the
seabed and ocean off the coast of the United States in order to fulfill its
duty to defend the nation and to regulate international commerce.' 61
Congress exercised its paramount power over the seabed by enacting the
SLA and OCSLA. These acts gave coastal states title to the seabed
within three miles of their shores 162 and extended federal jurisdiction
over the seabed resources beyond three miles from shore. 163 Twenty
years after passage of the Magnuson Act, the federal government
restricted access to the commercial halibut and sablefish fisheries in the
EEZ off Alaska to people who hold IFQs. 164 Today, most of the Eyak
villages' members cannot participate in the halibut and sablefish
fisheries because they do not hold IFQs.165
156. Alliance, 84 F.3d at 345.
157. 50 C.F.R. § 679.40(b).
158. Pacific Halibut Fisheries, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375, 59,377 (Nov. 9, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 679).
159. Pacific Halibut Fisheries; Subsistence Fishing, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,145, 18,159 (Apr. 15, 2003)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 300.65(g)(2)). Previously, the villagers were limited to two fish per
person per day during an eleven-month season. 2001 Pacific Halibut Fishery Regulations, § 23, 66
Fed. Reg. 15,801, 15,809 (Mar. 21, 2001).
160. Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 13 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
161. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34-35 (1947); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707,718-19 (1950).
162. 43 U.S.C. § 131 l(a)(l)-(2) (2000).
163. Id. § 1333(a)(1).
164. See Pacific Halibut Fisheries, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375 (Nov. 9, 1993) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
679).
165. LANGDON, supra note 16, at 126-27.
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III. ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO
ENFORCE THEIR OFFSHORE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS FOR
OVER TWO DECADES
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that only Congress has
the power to limit or extinguish aboriginal title.' 66 Consequently, five
Alaska Native villages argued in Eyak I and H that the IFQ program may
not restrict their aboriginal interests 67 in the seabed and ocean off
Alaska because Congress has not extinguished those interests.' 68 The
Eyak decisions followed litigation beginning with Village of Gambell v.
Clark (Gambell /),169 and involving similar claims made by different
Alaska Native villages in the 1980s and 1990s. 7 ° Although the Gambell
decisions implicitly recognized limited offshore aboriginal interests,' 71
the Eyak courts held that the paramountcy doctrine had extinguished all
aboriginal interests in the seabed and ocean off Alaska.' 72
A. The Gambell Litigation
In Gambell I, the Alaska Native villages of Gambell and Stebbins
sued to enjoin the Secretary of the Department of the Interior from
leasing the seabed off western Alaska to several oil companies. 173 The
villages argued that offshore development would negatively affect their
subsistence hunting and fishing rights, 174 but the Ninth Circuit held that
the villages had sacrificed those rights for part of the $962,500,000 and
40,000,000 acres awarded to Alaska Natives under the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 175 Congress passed ANCSA 176 to
166. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985) [hereinafter
Oneida II] (quoting Oneida I, 414 U.S. 661, 668 (1974)); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co.,
314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).
167. This Comment uses the term "aboriginal interests" to describe collectively the claims made
in Eyak I and H. In Eyak I, the villages claimed the exclusive right to exploit offshore areas based on
unextinguished aboriginal title. 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998). In Eyak H, the same villages
asserted non-exclusive rights-the alleged remnants of their aboriginal title. No. A98-0365-CV, slip
op. at 1-2 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
168. Eyakl, 154 F.3d at 1095; Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 15.
169. Vill. of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Gambell 1].
170. See, e.g., Gambell 111, 869 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1989).
171. See, e.g., id. at 1277.
172. Eyakl, 154 F.3d at 1096-97; Eyak l, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 27.
173. Gambell 1, 746 F.2d at 573.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 579.
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resolve the conflict between the State of Alaska and Alaska Natives over
rights to the land Alaska had selected for state ownership after its
statehood in 1958.' ANCSA settled the dispute by giving money and
land to Alaska Natives while also extinguishing the Natives' aboriginal
title to land and waters "in Alaska."' 7 8 After noting that Congress passed
ANCSA to "avoid further litigation of [aboriginal] claims," the Gambell
I court interpreted the phrase "in Alaska" to mean a "geographic region"
rather than the "area within the strict legal boundaries of the State of
Alaska."'' 79 Therefore, the court held that ANCSA extinguished the
villages' subsistence rights in waters beyond the boundaries of the State
of Alaska. 1
80
However, the Gambell I court also held that the villages could still
enjoin the federal government's leases to the oil companies under
section 810 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA).' 8 ' ANILCA 182 protects Alaska's rural residents' subsistence
hunting and fishing on over 100 million acres of land. 183 Section 810
allows the Secretary of the Interior to limit subsistence uses when
restrictions are necessary, but only after the Secretary attempts to avoid
impacting subsistence activity in the first place.' 84 Relying on the use of
the phrase "in Alaska" in its "general sense" during House debates on
ANILCA and on Congress' knowledge of the offshore hunting and
fishing habits of Alaska's coastal villagers, the Gambell I court
concluded that the phrase "in Alaska" carries the same meaning in
ANILCA as it does in ANCSA.185 Because it determined that
section 810 applies to waters beyond Alaska's boundaries, the court
176. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 689 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (2000)).
177. Gambell 1, 746 F.2d at 574.
178. "All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and
occupancy, including submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and
including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby extinguished." 43
U.S.C. § 1603(b).
179. Gambelll, 746 F.2d at 575-76.
180. Id. at 573.
181. Id. at 582.
182. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2000)).
183. COHEN, supra note 41, at 759.
184. 16 U.S.C. § 3120.
185. Gambell 1, 746 F.2d at 579.
Washington Law Review
enjoined the oil leases until the district court could evaluate the
Secretary's compliance with section 810."86
Following the Gambell I decision, the Secretary concluded that oil
exploration would not restrict the villages' subsistence uses.187 The
villages again sued to stop the exploration, but the District Court for the
District of Alaska declined to grant an injunction because the nation's
need for new energy sources outweighed the possibility that subsistence
uses would suffer. 88 The villages appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
reversed the district court. 189 Both the Secretary and the oil companies
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.'90 In Amoco Production Co. v.
Village of Gambell (Gambell 11),191 the Court held that section 810 does
not apply to the seabed and waters beyond Alaska's boundaries.
192
Deciding that the phrase "in Alaska" plainly refers to the political
boundaries of the State of Alaska, the Court declined to extend
ANILCA's reach based on its legislative history. 93 However, the Court
revived the possibility that the Gambell villages could eventually
enforce their subsistence rights when it vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment that ANCSA extinguished aboriginal interests in the seabed
and waters beyond Alaska's boundaries. 1
94
On remand, the Ninth Circuit in Village of Gambell v. Hodel
(Gambell JJ)195 reconsidered the geographic scope of ANCSA in light
of Gambell II's interpretation of the phrase "in Alaska" from
ANILCA.196 The Ninth Circuit reversed its Gambell I decision and held
that ANCSA does not reach beyond three miles from shore and therefore
did not extinguish "aboriginal subsistence rights" that may exist in the
seabed and waters beyond Alaska's boundaries.197 Although the Gambell
III court eliminated ANCSA as a defense to offshore aboriginal title
claims, the court did not definitively answer the oil companies' second
defense, that aboriginal title is incompatible with the United States'
186. Id. at 582-83.
187. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vii. ofGambell, 480 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1987) [hereinafter Gambell II].
188. /d. at 540.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 534 n.1.
191. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
192. Id. at 555.
193. Id. at 552-53.
194. Id. at 555.
195. 869 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1989).
196. Id. at 1275.
197. Id. at 1280.
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sovereignty over the seabed and waters beyond three miles from
shore. 1
98
This defense was based on the 1982 decision Inupiat Community of
the Arctic Slope v. United States (Inupiat).199 In Inupiat, the District
Court for the District of Alaska rejected the Alaska Native plaintiffs'2 00
claim of "sovereign power" over the Beaufort and Chuckchi Seas as
contrary to federal paramountcy over those waters.201 In Gambell III, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Inupiat because the Inupiat plaintiffs argued
that they had never succumbed to the sovereignty of the United States,20 2
while the Gambell villages simply claimed "rights of occupancy and use
that are subordinate to and consistent with national interests., 20 3 For that
reason, the court held that the paramountcy doctrine had not
extinguished the villages' "aboriginal rights." 204 Ultimately, the
GambellIII court did not foreclose the oil companies' paramountcy
doctrine defense because it recognized only the possible existence of
limited subsistence rights, not aboriginal title.205 The Ninth Circuit left it
to the district court to determine whether the villages in fact held
subsistence rights to offshore areas leased to the oil companies.20 6
The Gambell litigation ended with Village of Gambell v. Babbitt
(Gambell IV) 2°7 when the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the case was moot because all the oil companies had given
up their offshore leases. 20 8 This closure left the villages of Gambell and
Stebbins in essentially the same legal position as when they first sued the
Secretary of the Interior. The villages' residents could continue their
subsistence harvest free from interference by oil exploration, but without
the protection afforded by aboriginal title. The next opportunity for
Alaska Natives to assert aboriginal title to the seabed and waters beyond
198. Id. at 1276.
199. 548 F. Supp. 182, 185 (D. Alaska 1982) (citing United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515
(1975); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707
(1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)).
200. The Inupiat plaintiffs were amici in Gambell HL. Gambel 111, 869 F.2d at 1276.
201. Inupial, 548 F. Supp. at 185.
202. Id. at 187.
203. Gambell 111, 869 F.2d at 1276.
204. Id. at 1277.
205. Id. at 1280.
206. Id.
207. 999 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1993).
208. Id. at 407.
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Alaska's boundaries arose when the IFQ program restricted the Eyak
villages' ability to fish for halibut and sablefish.2 °9
B. The Eyak Litigation
The IFQ regulations allow non-Alaska Native commercial harvesters
to fish for halibut and sablefish within what five Alaska Native villages
claim are their traditional waters in Prince William Sound, lower Cook
Inlet, and the Gulf of Alaska. 21 0 The regulations also exclude villagers
without IFQs from commercially harvesting halibut and sablefish from
those areas and all other regulated waters. 211 The Eyak litigation began
when the villages sued to enjoin enforcement of the IFQ program by the
Secretary of the Department of Commerce and also for a declaration that
they hold aboriginal title to, and thus the exclusive right to exploit, their
traditional use areas beyond three miles from shore.212 In granting
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, the District Court for the
District of Alaska held that the paramountcy doctrine had extinguished
the villages' claimed aboriginal title.2 3 The court explained that the
villages, like the states, could not possess property rights to the seabed
and ocean because both the villages and the states depend on the United
States for protection.214
The villages appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district
court erred by basing its decision on the theory that the villages'
aboriginal title claim was equivalent to the state claims in the
paramountcy cases. 2 5 The villages maintained that their claim was
different because aboriginal title is not a claim of sovereignty but a right
of exclusive use and occupancy, qualified by Congress' ability to
extinguish that right.21 6 To support their argument, the villages cited the
Gambell I court's holding that "aboriginal rights may exist
209. See infra Part Il.B; see also Nome Eskimo Cmty. v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.
1995) (dismissing as moot aboriginal title claim virtually identical to that advanced in the Gambell
litigation).
210. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d. 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1091-92. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished the villages' rights
within three miles of shore. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2000).
213. Eyak/, 154 F.3d. at 1092.
214. ld. at 1094.
215. Id. at 1095.
216. Id.
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concurrently with a paramount federal interest, without undermining that
interest."
217
In Eyak I, the Ninth Circuit limited its earlier decision in Gambell III
by holding that the Gambell III court recognized only non-exclusive
offshore subsistence rights.21 8 The Eyak I court reasoned that reading
Gambell III to recognize aboriginal title, which allows no third-party
incursions, would be inconsistent with the Gambell III court's
instruction to the district court to determine whether oil exploration
would substantially interfere with the Gambell villages' rights.219 The
Eyak I court could not discern "a practical difference" between the
villages' aboriginal title claim and Texas' failed assertion in United
States v. Texas that it owned the resources of the seabed while the
United States retained otherwise "unimpaired sovereignty over the
sea." 220 Because the Texas Court's holding that the federal government
must control all property seaward of the low-tide line did not distinguish
between state property and other property, the Eyak I court concluded
that aboriginal title to the seabed and ocean is as contrary to federal
sovereignty as was Texas' claim.221 Therefore, the court held that the
paramountcy doctrine extinguished the villages' title to offshore areas
beyond Alaska's boundaries.222 Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit
"[left] for another day" the question of whether the villages still
possessed non-exclusive aboriginal rights independent of aboriginal
title.223
That day dawned when the Eyak I villages filed another complaint
against the Secretary of Commerce.224 While the villages had argued in
Eyak I that their aboriginal title gave them the exclusive right to exploit
certain areas of the seabed and ocean off Alaska,225 in Eyak H the
villages claimed that the IFQ regulations interfered with their non-
exclusive right to participate in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish
fisheries.226 The District Court for the District of Alaska observed that
217. Id. (citing Gambell 111, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1095-96 (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950)).
221. Id. at 1096-97.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1092 n.4.
224. Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
225. Eyakl, 154 F.3d at 1091.
226. Eyak l, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 15.
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aboriginal rights are usually exclusive rights founded upon aboriginal
title,227 but also noted that "[a]boriginal hunting and fishing rights can
exist without aboriginal title. 228
The court compared the villages' asserted non-exclusive rights to
those enjoyed by another ocean-going tribe, the Makah of Washington
State.229 By the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay, the Makah retained their right
to fish "in common with" United States citizens230 at the Makah's
fishing grounds as far as forty miles from shore.231 Unlike the Makah,
Alaska Native villages never signed treaties with the United States. 232
However, the Eyak H court concluded that the villages theoretically
could still possess non-exclusive fishing rights because ANCSA had
"implicit[ly] reserv[ed]" those rights beyond Alaska's boundaries when
it extinguished the villages' exclusive rights within Alaska.2 33
Ultimately, the Eyak H court decided that non-exclusive rights are
also repugnant to federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean.234
Because the villages' claimed rights stemmed from their former
sovereignty over their territory, the court held that their rights had been
extinguished when the federal government extended its own sovereignty
over the seabed and ocean.235 According to the Eyak II court, exclusive
and non-exclusive rights equally threaten the "dominance of national
sovereignty, 236 because of the Texas Court's holding that all offshore
property rights must "coalesce and unite in the national sovereign.' 23
7
The court distinguished the Makah's non-exclusive rights in the Pacific
Ocean on the grounds that the Makah reserved those rights by treaty.238
Citing to Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court found that the
227. Id. at 21.
228. Id. (citing COHEN, supra note 41, at 442).
229. Id. at 30.
230. Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, U.S.-Makah Tribe, art. IV, 12 Stat. 939, 940.
23 1. Midwater Trawlers Co-operative v. Evans, 282 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1984).
232. Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 9.
233. Id. at 23-24.
234. Id. at 27.
235. Id. at 28.
236. Id. at 27.
237. Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950)).
238. Id. at 29.
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paramountcy doctrine essentially effected a "full title extinguishment"
that only non-exclusive treaty rights survived.239
On reconsideration, the district court rejected the villages' argument
that Congress preserved their aboriginal rights by a savings clause in
OCSLA.24 ° OCSLA protects rights to areas of the seabed beyond three
miles from shore under the "law in effect at the time they may have been
acquired., 241 The legislative history of this provision reveals that
Congress intended to extend the doctrine of discovery, which protects
aboriginal title, to the seabed:
[OCSLA] asserts Federal jurisdiction and control over the
Continental Shelf areas beyond original State boundaries, thus
bringing the lands and resources within such areas into the same
legal status as those acquired by the United States through
cession or annexation; in the alternative, such lands and
resources are subject to the doctrine of discovery.242
Despite OCSLA's apparent recognition of the fact that aboriginal title
could exist in the seabed, the court held that the savings clause did not
protect the villages' aboriginal rights.243 The court reasoned that those
rights had been extinguished in 1950,244 the year of the Texas decision
culminating the development of the paramountcy doctrine 245 and before
Congress enacted OCSLA in 1953.246
Almost two centuries after Johnson, both the Eyak I and II courts
applied the U.S. Supreme Court's paramountcy doctrine to offshore
239. Id. at 29-30 (citing Confederated Tribes of Chehalis v. Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 341 (9th
Cir. 1996); W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1991);
Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, 655 F.2d 176, 180 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981)).
240. Order (Motion for Reconsideration) at 5, Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV (D. Alaska Nov. 14,
2002). The villages cited savings clauses in the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000), the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, id. § 1342, and the Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(A)
(2000).
241. 43 U.S.C. § 1342.
242. H. REP. No. 82-695 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1395, 1411.
243. Order (Motion for Reconsideration) at 5-6, Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV.
244. Id.
245. Eyak 11, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 30 n.22 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
246. Although the Eyak 11 court cited to COHEN, supra note 41, at 442, for the proposition that
aboriginal rights can exist apart from aboriginal title, Cohen does not cite to any U.S. Supreme
Court decisions supporting that conclusion. Furthermore, when the villages petitioned the Court
following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Eyak I, they argued that the Gambell III court must have
recognized exclusive aboriginal rights because "all aboriginal rights are, by definition, exclusive."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.5, Eyak 1, 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-1437). This
Comment agrees with the villages' position in Eyak I and in their subsequent petition for a writ of
certiorari. Therefore, this Comment will discuss only the compatibility of aboriginal title and
exclusive fishing rights with federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean.
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aboriginal title claims instead of the Court's traditional aboriginal title
analysis.247 In Eyak I, the Ninth Circuit interpreted its Gambell III
precedent to permit only non-exclusive subsistence rights in the seabed
and ocean.248 In Eyak II, the District Court for the District of Alaska
extended Eyak I by holding that the paramountcy doctrine extinguished
all aboriginal rights to the seabed and ocean not reserved by treaty.
2 49
After Eyak I and II, therefore, the villages have neither exclusive nor
non-exclusive rights to offshore areas, despite the Gambell III court's
holding that "aboriginal rights may exist concurrently with a paramount
federal interest, without undermining that interest."
250
IV. ABORIGINAL TITLE SHOULD SURVIVE THE
PARAMOUNTCY DOCTRINE BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT
WITH FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SEABED AND
OCEAN
The Ninth Circuit en banc 251 or the U.S. Supreme Court should hold
that the paramountcy doctrine did not extinguish exclusive hunting and
fishing rights founded upon aboriginal title to the seabed and ocean off
Alaska. Neither the national security nor the economic concerns of the
paramountcy cases justify extinguishing aboriginal title because the
Court considered those same concerns in its aboriginal title cases and
still recognized tribes' right to exclusively use their territories.
252
Furthermore, federal actions acknowledging, preserving, and enforcing
offshore aboriginal interests before and after the paramountcy cases
support the conclusion that judicial recognition of the villages' title is in
the nation's interest and consistent with federal sovereignty over the
seabed and ocean.
253
247. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th. Cir. 1998); Eyak 11, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 28.
248. Eyakl, 154 F.3d at 1095.
249. Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 27.
250. Gambell 111, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989).
251. The Ninth Circuit can recognize that aboriginal title is consistent with federal sovereignty
over the seabed and ocean only by reversing its Eyak I decision en banc.
252. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 289 (1955); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573-74 (1823).
253. Congress must pay to extinguish a tribe's aboriginal title if it has formally recognized that
title. Congress is under no constitutional obligation to pay to extinguish aboriginal title recognized
only by the courts. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 288-89.
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A. The Eyak Courts Misapplied the U.S. Supreme Court's Aboriginal
Title Analysis
As illustrated by its decision in Gambell III, the Ninth Circuit closely
followed the Santa Fe three-part analysis prior to Eyak L 254 The Gambell
III court first recognized that the United States had extended its
sovereignty over the seabed and ocean.2 5 Next, the court determined
that offshore aboriginal title had not been extinguished.256 Lastly, the
court remanded the case to the district court to complete the third step of
the analysis, an inquiry into whether the Gambell villages' rights existed
in fact.257 The Eyak I and H courts erred by conflating the first and
second steps of the aboriginal title analysis. The courts held that
extending federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean via the
paramountcy doctrine amounted to an extinguishment of offshore
aboriginal title.258 This truncated analysis is contrary to U.S. Supreme
Court precedent holding that federal law protects aboriginal title, and its
associated exclusive use rights, only after extension of federal
sovereignty over new territory.
259
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Aboriginal Title Analysis Should
Control Claims ofAboriginal Title to the Seabed and Ocean
The Ninth Circuit en banc or the U.S. Supreme Court should apply
the Court's traditional three-step aboriginal title analysis to offshore
aboriginal title claims because the government's interest in maintaining
control over the territories it acquires was at the root of both the
paramountcy and the aboriginal title cases. In California and Texas, the
Court held that the federal government must control the ocean and
seabed in order to fulfill its sovereign duties to protect the nation and to
254. Gambell Ii, 869 F.2d at 1276-80. Contra Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 185 (D. Alaska 1982) (applying paramountcy doctrine).
255. Gambell 111, 869 F.2d at 1278.
256. Id. at 1278-80.
257. Id. at 1280. The shortcoming of the court's analysis is its failure to realize that the extension
of federal sovereignty should protect aboriginal title and not merely subsistence rights, id. at 1278,
for the reasons set forth infra Part IV. B-C.
258. Eyak 1, 154 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1998); Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 28
(D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
259. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823); see also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R.
Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941).
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regulate international commerce. 260 The Court feared that state
ownership of offshore territory and disposal of its resources would
interfere with the nation's ability to fight wars on, and conduct
commerce over, the ocean.26' These frontier concerns, however, are not
uniquely maritime. As Justice Reed noted in his dissent in Texas,
"[n]ational responsibility is no greater in respect to the marginal sea than
it is toward every other particle of American territory." 262 The doctrine
of discovery developed in Johnson, and applied to aboriginal title cases
ever since, accommodates the same fears stressed by the Court in the
paramountcy cases.
263
National security concerns do not justify extinguishing aboriginal title
to the seabed and ocean because aboriginal title does not give to tribes
the power to admit foreign entities within their territory. In California,
the Court worried that states would allow foreign agencies to exploit
offshore resources and that this would severely undermine the federal
government's ability to keep the peace. 264 The U.S. Supreme Court's
aboriginal title jurisprudence, on the other hand, anticipated and
accounted for the possibility that foreign interests would attempt to
infiltrate United States territory through Indian country.265 Johnson
allowed post-"discovery" Indians to convey their territory only to the
United States because conveyance to any other entity would have lead to
the outcome the doctrine of discovery seeks to avoid: "conflicting
settlements and consequent war" among nations.266 Today, the federal
government could defend the nation against foreign attempts to
politically engage the villages, or to acquire their rights to offshore
areas, because, as the Court explained in Cherokee Nation, such attempts
"would be considered by all as an invasion of [the United States']
territory and an act of hostility.,,
267
Economic concerns also fail to support the conclusion that the
paramountcy doctrine extinguished offshore aboriginal title. The ability
260. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 35-36 (1947).
261. California, 332 U.S. at 36.
262. Texas, 339 U.S. at 723 (Reed, J., dissenting).
263. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-74.
264. California, 332 U.S. at 29, 35.
265. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543,
573-74 (1823).
266. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-74.
267. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
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of the United States to conduct "world commerce ''268 over the Pacific
Ocean would remain paramount even with judicially recognized
aboriginal title to the seabed and ocean. Aboriginal title would not
deprive the United States of any mineral or fisheries resources it desires
because Congress can extinguish congressionally unrecognized
aboriginal title without paying compensation to the affected tribe.269
Furthermore, aboriginal title would have no unwanted impact on foreign
or interstate trade because tribal trade relations are the exclusive
province of Congress.27°
While the California and Texas Courts held that the federal
government must have the power to determine "in the first instance, 27'
who may exploit the seabed and ocean off the United States,272 the
Court's aboriginal title jurisprudence demonstrates that the "first"
federal policy toward acquired lands is that they come "subject only to
the Indian right of occupancy. '273 In Santa Fe, the Court enforced that
policy by upholding aboriginal title in the face of the cross-country
expansion of the railroad system.274 Similarly, in Shoshone Tribe the
Court explained that the Shoshone were entitled to compensation for
minerals taken from land set aside for them by Congress because the
tribe held those resources by dint of aboriginal title established by
"undisturbed possess[ion] of the soil from time immemorial. '275
The Santa Fe and Shoshone Tribe decisions demonstrate that tribes
retain their exclusive right to use and occupy their territory after it falls
under United States sovereignty. By holding that offshore aboriginal
interests would frustrate the federal government's ability to control
exploitation of seabed and ocean resources, the Eyak courts failed to
appreciate U.S. Supreme Court precedent protecting aboriginal title to
natural resources within acquired territories. Because the Court has
found neither national security nor economic concerns reason enough to
reverse its aboriginal title precedent, the Ninth Circuit en banc or the
268. California, 332 U.S. at 35.
269. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 289 (1955).
270. Oneida 11, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 (Indian commerce clause).
271. California, 332 U.S. at 29.
272. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950); California, 332 U.S. at 38-39.
273. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
274. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 359-60 (1941).
275. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938).
Washington Law Review
U.S. Supreme Court should apply the Court's traditional aboriginal title
analysis to aboriginal title claims to the seabed and ocean.
C. There Is a Strong Federal Interest in Recognizing Aboriginal Title
to the Seabed and Ocean
In Texas, the Court held that control of the seabed and ocean involves
"national interests and national responsibilities. 276 The Eyak I and H
courts decided that this language, which swept aside state claims to the
seabed in the paramountcy cases, also extinguished the villages' offshore
277aboriginal interests. However, a series of federal actions before and
after the paramountcy cases reveal that aboriginal title to the seabed and
ocean is in the nation's interest. As demonstrated by a 1942 opinion by
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,278 the Alaska Statehood
Act, 279 OCSLA,280 and federal efforts to enforce the offshore fishing
rights of the Makah of Washington State,281 the federal government has
acknowledged, preserved, and fought for aboriginal interests in the
seabed and ocean. This dedication demonstrates that those interests are
national interests that survived the paramountcy doctrine.
1. At the Time of the Paramountcy Cases, the Federal Government
Acted to Protect Aboriginal Title to Offshore Areas
Before and after the paramountcy decisions, the federal government
acknowledged the existence of aboriginal interests in the seabed and
ocean off Alaska and acted to preserve them. For example, in 1942 the
Solicitor of the Interior observed that Alaska Natives recognized,
between themselves, exclusive rights to exploit ocean areas and the
seabed off Alaska.282 The Solicitor concluded that those rights survived
the extension of Russian, and later American, sovereignty over Alaska
Native territory.283 Sixteen years after the Solicitor's opinion, Congress
preserved those rights when it admitted the State of Alaska into the
276. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
277. Eyak I, 154 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1998); Eyak 11, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 28
(D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
278. Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 462 (1942).
279. Alaska Statehood Act (Statehood Act) of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §4, 72 Stat. 339, 339.
280. 43 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
282. Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461,462 (1942).
283. Id. at 464, 476.
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Union.284 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Kake, the Alaska
Statehood Act neither extinguished nor recognized Alaska Natives'
rights, but left them "unimpaired.,
285
Similarly, through OCSLA Congress protected aboriginal rights to the
seabed beyond three miles from shore under the "law in effect at the
time they may have been acquired., 286 The legislative history of this
provision reveals that Congress intended to protect aboriginal title by
subjecting the seabed to the "doctrine of discovery." 287 This is consistent
with the Court's holding in Santa Fe that all territory acquired by the
United States comes subject to aboriginal title.288
The Eyak 11 court held that the Solicitor's opinion was irrelevant
because it was written before the Court developed the paramountcy
doctrine. 289 For purposes of interpreting the paramountcy doctrine's
effect, it does not matter that the Solicitor's opinion pre-dated the
paramountcy doctrine. The Solicitor's opinion indicates that before the
Court developed the paramountcy doctrine it was in the nation's interest
to acknowledge aboriginal rights to the seabed. The paramountcy
doctrine invalidated only those claims that were contrary to the nation's
interest. 29° The Solicitor's opinion simply shows that aboriginal title was
not a claim contrary to the nation's interest.
The Eyak II court also held that the Statehood Act and OCSLA do not
support the villages' claims because they were enacted after the
paramountcy doctrine, and thus could not preserve extinguished
rights.291 This holding, however, renders the acts' savings clauses
inconsequential, an effect contrary to that required by the traditional
canon of statutory construction "that a statute should be interpreted so as
not to render one part inoperative. 292 In sum, the Solicitor's opinion, the
Statehood Act, and OCSLA support the conclusion that extension of
federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean did not extinguish the
284. Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 65 (1962).
285. Id.
286. 43 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
287. H. REP. NO. 82-695 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1395, 1411.
288. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941).
289. Order (Motion for Reconsideration) at 5-6, Eyak II, No. A98-0365-CV (D. Alaska Nov. 14,
2002).
290. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
291. Order (Motion for Reconsideration) at 5-6, Eyak 11, No. A98-0365-CV.
292. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985).
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villages' offshore aboriginal title because that title is a "national interest
and national responsibilit[y]. '293
2. Thirty Years After the Paramountcy Decisions, the Federal
Government Intervened to Protect the Makah 's Fishing Rights in
the Pacific Ocean
The Makah's fishing rights provide another example of federal
protection of offshore aboriginal interests. Rather than resisting the
Makah's post-paramountcy fishing, the United States successfully sued
on behalf of the Makah to enforce their right to fish out to forty miles
from shore.2 94 According to the Eyak II court, federal paramountcy
accommodated the Makah's fishing rights, but not the villages' rights,
because the Makah, unlike the villages, reserved their rights by treaty.295
Yet the decisions upholding the Makah's rights do not discuss the
paramountcy doctrine or why treaty rights survived it.296 The primary
distinction between treaty and non-treaty rights is that the government
must compensate tribes when it abrogates the former but not the latter.297
The fact that the federal government would go to court to enforce
aboriginal rights that it must pay to abrogate is evidence that aboriginal
title, which the government need not pay to extinguish, is also
compatible with federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eyak I and H courts invoked the paramountcy doctrine to explain
why five Alaska Native villages no longer have aboriginal interests in
the seabed and ocean off Alaska. In its paramountcy decisions, United
States v. California and United States v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the federal government must have exclusive control over
offshore areas to fulfill its sovereign duties to protect the nation and to
regulate international commerce. Neither national security nor economic
concerns justify extinguishing aboriginal title to the seabed and ocean
293. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
294. United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1984).
295. Eyak 11, No. A98-0365-CV, slip op. at 30-31 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
296. Washington, 730 F.2d at 1318 (discussing Makah's historical fishing in waters out to forty
miles offshore); see also Midwater Trawlers Co-operative v. Evans, 282 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding nothing in Treaty of Neah Bay that explicitly limited geographic extent of Makah's
fishing rights).
297. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 284-85 (1955); COHEN, supra
note 41, at 491.
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because aboriginal title accommodates these 'concerns. Tribal
enforcement of aboriginal title would not threaten the nation because
tribes may not convey their territory to, or form political connections
with, foreign entities. Furthermore, offshore aboriginal title would not
complicate federal regulation of international oceanic trade because the
Fifth Amendment does not require that Congress pay to extinguish
congressionally unrecognized aboriginal title. For these reasons,
aboriginal title is fully compatible with federal sovereignty over the
seabed and ocean. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit en banc or the U.S.
Supreme Court should apply the Court's traditional aboriginal title
analysis, rather than the paramountcy doctrine, when analyzing offshore
aboriginal title claims.
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